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SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS OBJECT

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It is the purpose of this paper to discuss social consciousness with reference to its function in the development of consciousness of the self and of particular objects, and especially in building up the consciousness of a Group Self or Ideal Personality. The first two problems have had considerable treatment in recent psychological literature, but the further implications of this general point of view remain to be worked out.

It is fairly well accepted that the individual comes gradually to self-consciousness through his interaction with other individuals. Every human being, if he is to live at all, is, from infancy, surrounded and cared for by persons. These persons fit into and help to constitute a social group. The child is nourished, sheltered, guided and disciplined by this human environment. All objects and influences are mediated by the persons near him. His very sensations are determined and modified by them. These persons are the moving objects in his field of vision and are therefore the first to catch his eye and to furnish vivid tactual and auditory sensations. As he becomes old enough to appreciate it even dimly, he finds himself talked to, and talked about, now made the center of attention and again ignored by the grown-ups. He exerts influence over these others by his cries, calls and antics. He discriminates between them and discovers that he has peculiar charms for certain ones. All such experiences contribute to the polarization of consciousness in the ego and alter, the self and others. This process continues to be elaborated through life, at least during any vital contact with other persons. The self is thus always changing in consciousness, and does not attain a final form or completeness. A permanent,

unmodified self would be the counterpart of a fixed and changeless social order, if indeed there could be any consciousness whatever in such an order.

Further light has been thrown upon this operation of social relations in developing the consciousness of self, by the investigations of the actual modes of communication between individuals.¹ The study of language has yielded fruit here almost in direct proportion to the emphasis put upon the dynamic, motor phase of speech. The approach to the more abstract word-symbols from the side of instinctive reactions and sign language has given unity and simplicity to the interpretation of the psychological process. Gesture is the term employed to designate any movement, sign, or vocalization which conveys meaning. In sign language, as in the signals of a train crew, or in the motions and facial expressions accompanying animated speech, the gestures are reduced or 'truncated' until they are often merely vestigial in character. Originally, the vocalizations were quite secondary to the movements and bodily attitudes, as is now the case with dogs and monkeys in their play or fighting; but spoken and written words are so suited to more elaborate and refined communication that they have become dominant in developed human experience. If, then, speech is regarded from the standpoint of the physiological adjustments involved, such as the action of the vocal organs, and the subtle, facile play of facial expression and bodily attitudes, it is apparent that this inclusive use of the term 'gesture' for all forms of direct communication is not forced or arbitrary.

Now, it has been shown that the consciousness of self arises in carrying on this interplay of gesture and response. The particular point in the process where such reflective consciousness appears is in the control of one's own gestures in reference to the gestures or responses of another, or of several other persons. One becomes aware that the other reacts according to one's own movements. One sees himself from the other's standpoint. This entering into the consciousness of other persons and making comparison with one's own, is essentially the social consciousness. In competitive games of skill and prowess an individual is thrown back upon self-analysis to determine how he may direct himself to outwit his opponent or to outdo his best efforts. He may secure the assistance of a trainer and coach. It is their business to help him to become aware of his weak points by viewing himself as they view him. They bring him

¹G. H. MEAD. 'Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning.' *PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN*, 1910, 7, 397.

to consciousness of himself by opposing him, by giving him practice in self-direction. He secures by this friendly criticism and testing a familiarity with his own sensations and movements, which enables him to improve and to realize a larger and more efficient self.

The use of oral, and especially of written, speech affords an incalculably great variety of social contacts and associations through which the personality of the modern individual is developed. Such a range of comparison, coöperation and conflict is altogether beyond the limits of sense perception, and is necessarily the work of the imagination. Here, the give and take of actual conversation is repeated among the people remembered and imagined. This dramatic rehearsal and anticipation of actual events in the mind is a genuine social experience and is quite as significant in its contribution to self-consciousness as the original upon which it is fashioned.

If we turn to the accounts given of our consciousness of physical objects, we find that here too the social consciousness is regarded as the determining condition.¹ The only way in which objects come to have significance for us is in reference to our conduct, and that conduct is social in its nature. It is obvious that the individual gets his introduction to objects in childhood, and practically through life, by means of the social medium. The uses of objects, their names, their values and their properties are designated for him. The child's frequent confusion of the labels and meanings of the adult world are amusing to his elders; but with maturity, his mistakes cease to be entertaining. He is required to conform, and if he should still persist in employing the fanciful and chance associations of childhood, he would be deemed unfit to share in the normal world of men and things. He cannot longer call ink-spots, 'buttons'; or confuse stacks of oats with 'dishes of ice cream.' He is bound to regard these and all other objects in the orthodox manner of the group to which he belongs or suffer real inconveniences and penalties. Books must not be apperceived as fuel, nor street lights as targets.

One of the greatest difficulties in realizing this social determination of individual perception is the failure to recognize sufficiently the dynamic, functional character of perception. Owing to our long established, facile habits of seeing, touching and manipulating things, we have scarcely any consciousness of these acts through which alone the objects in the world about us are 'given.' Since the process of knowing them is overlooked, the objects appear to stand

¹ JOSEPH ROYCE. 'Self-consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature.' *Studies in Good and Evil*, Chapter VIII.

there stark and stiff in space. It seems the depths of metaphysical debauchery to assert that these physical realities have their being in the social consciousness. But when perception is stated in functional terms, the way is opened to an appreciation of its social aspect. Functionally the object is always conditioned by its uses. A sword is a weapon for hewing and piercing the enemy. Hung upon the wall of one's 'den,' it is a shining ornament. If it, and all objects of its class, had never been used except in this way, a sword would have no suggestion of blood and carnage. This principle applies to the inmost nature of steel as well as to its form. The physical properties of it are the formulæ of certain reactions obtained in the laboratory in the solution and statement of the problems of the physicist. 'Steel' is the name for definite forms of behavior, describable phases of experience. Its very hardness is a declaration of characteristic uses. These uses have been generalized, simplified and associated into definite sensations of touch and strain so that we are accustomed to feel of the metal and upon the ground of that feeling to pronounce the object hard. We do not take into account the long, complex and obscure process which has contributed to the facility with which we pass from the sensation to the judgment. The recovery of that process is difficult and, in its entirety, may be impossible. But that there is such a process and, in large part, *what* the process is, have been brilliantly and permanently recorded by modern psychology. Every object perceived *means* something to the perceiver. That meaning is of the essence of the object's reality. To be sure, the meaning may change but that is only to say that the object changes as well as the self perceiving it. All this is only to assert and insist upon the trite doctrine that all objects of our experience *are* objects of our experience, and that it is futile to discuss them, even as existing, outside of this experience. Few persons, however, are able or disposed to analyze and reconstruct in conscious reflection this subject-object relation. And of those professional psychologists who do accomplish it, many are not interested to follow out the implications of the facts. The result is that the naïve assumption of the self somehow related to the brain, with an object over against it, out there in space, continues to fortify the object in its mysterious isolation. Its inner essence is thus allowed a rôle of great importance, though in fact it is a sham and delusion. Its 'substance' is all conditioned—that is, relative—but the conditioning operation is constantly overlooked and an entity is posited as existing in its own right.

Now just as the object possesses and preserves its identity and reality only as an experienced object, so the self for which it is a presentation has its nature and function within a social order, as has been stated above. The case is not adequately expressed by pointing out that the perceiving self is one of many similar selves interacting upon each other. The mind of the individual is a social affair through and through. The instincts of man are social and their fulfillment involves the realization of a group life. All the processes of emotion and knowledge are phases of this social experience. The objects of perception are registrations of these group habits and activities. Their uses and names are fixed by the group's struggle for existence and the accompanying activities. In order to live and be in good standing with his people, an individual must live their life, see nature with their eyes, and keep the ancestral meanings for the things encountered. Departure from this way of viewing the world easily puts one out with his fellows, makes him appear uncanny and dangerous, if not criminal. The control and direction which social acts thus exert in sense-perception is comparable to the social aspect of the formation of language. The latter involves auditory and visual perceptions and motor adjustments. The words are as fixed as the things they designate. They have essentially the same definiteness and objectivity. To the primitive mind, words are real existences as much as sticks and stones, yet these words, to our reflective analysis, are social objects having no reality or function apart from the usage of a group. The physical objects of our environment are dependent to the core upon functional, social experience. The world of nature is our world, not as the possession of separate individuals but as the structure and operation of social consciousness in and through individuals. The self-consciousness of individuals is real and genuine but it has its reality within the social order and within the order of nature, standing related to both of these and they to it, in the manner just indicated.

I have dealt with the determination of finite self-consciousness and of physical things in the medium of social consciousness. I wish now to present some considerations concerning the development of group consciousness and the corresponding Object or Ideal Self, as these appear in reflective thought.

The process by which a sense of the group arises is not fundamentally different from that already described in the case of individual self-consciousness. Indeed the two develop together. The members of a group become conscious of the group as such through experiences

which put it into contrast with other groups, as in war; or the feeling for the group as a whole may arise when coöperation with other groups is planned, as in setting the bounds of the hunting grounds or in the common use of a water supply, or in the exchange of goods. In all such matters, the group is forced to take some account of itself, of its fighting strength, its base of supplies, its ceremonials, its industries and products as compared with those of neighboring peoples. The preparation of a tribe or nation for war is not unlike that of an individual contemplating a conflict with an enemy. There is the same envisaging of the situation, an attempt to anticipate the movements and strength of the opponent, a working up of emotion by recalling the injuries to be avenged and by tasting the sweets of victory in imagination. Perhaps it is in defeat or disaster that the group is most sharply stung into a realization of its needs. At such times the past is reviewed and vivified; old men are counselled; old ceremonials are reënacted; emotion rises to unusual pitch and overflows into channels long in disuse or cuts new paths into adventurous experiments. All such groping about, all such trial and error and partial success welds together the group, gives it a sense of solidarity and of corporate power. It is a significant fact that the group consciousness is most developed among those peoples which have preserved their identity against the greatest odds. The Jewish race is the stock illustration. Their race-consciousness has been strong enough not to give way under the strain of persecution, exile and ostracism, and has been hardened and annealed by these experiences.

Quite different results have appeared among those peoples inhabiting regions where the food supply was adequate and accessible and where neighboring tribes were sufficiently peaceful to require little, if any, military organization. Such conditions prevailed in the life of certain African tribes with the result that they developed scarcely any social coherence. Their customs were slight and insecure, their group-consciousness did not develop persistently and their tribal deities attained little definite character or influence.¹

It is also of importance to note that the group-consciousness, like the consciousness of self in the individual, grows in the direction of stress and interest. Where war is the conspicuous and absorbing occupation of a people, it becomes conscious of itself as a military group and the attainment of that feeling about itself is registered in its war god. Where the cultivation of rice is a stable and well organized occupation, a rice deity appears. In a country where the

¹ IRVING KING. *The Development of Religion*, p. 95.

appearance of vegetation follows quickly and surprisingly upon the rainfall, it is natural that the alert and taut attention of the group should magnify the rain as god. Drouth and recurring showers, especially when the latter follow upon ceremonials designed to bring rain, serve to establish this religious object more securely. Here probably is the key to polytheism. Polytheism is the natural accompaniment of the numerous social habits or selves of the group. Since these habits have grown up under the pressure of varying interests, they have not been adequately coördinated. They persist within the life of the tribe or nation, alternating in importance and prominence according to the exigencies and fortunes of the group. The attainment of monotheism occurs where the life interests are simple enough or sufficiently unified to express themselves naturally through, and in reference to, one main activity or natural object. Some primitive peoples may possibly represent that status. But the significant monotheism of civilized man is only approached where the group life attains unity in its social organization, and is centered in the person of a monarch. In this type of society, the dominant function of the king has usually been that of leadership in war; but this has generally involved the necessity of caring for the food supply, transportation, public works and the codification of laws with reference to the various interests of the people. The tendency, under these circumstances, has been for the national consciousness to exalt the ruler as its highest objectification, and to deify him. The group then employs this representative, ideal Person, as a means of seeing itself in its moral and practical relations. He is another Self with whom genuine social relations are experienced quite in the same manner as with the individuals of the same or other groups. Thus the social consciousness is extended and enriched.

As the group thus comes to consciousness of itself through the organization and exercise of social control, the Group Spirit gains definiteness and idealization. The imagery and patterns through which the Group Spirit is represented are determined by those interests which are the foci of attention in the actual life of the people. Thus Yahwe, the embodiment of the Group Spirit of the ancient Hebrews, was represented as a Sheep in their pastoral period, as a Bull in a later stage, and finally as a King when the tribes were controlled by judges and kings.¹ It is important to realize, however, that in each instance the emotional attitude toward the object gave

¹I have sketched this development in my book, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, Chapter X.

it a significance far beyond what we may call its 'natural' character. The sense of group identity, the sources of material welfare, and the means of victory in war, were bound up with Yahwe under all these forms. Under the monarchy, he took on the new qualities of kingly wisdom and power, which were emphasized by the best interpreters of the national consciousness. As the human king became the agent and medium through which the social organism sought a fuller life, he became the type of that far loftier, wiser and mightier Being, loyalty to whom must determine the final prosperity and destiny of the nation.

This supreme Being or Object of the social consciousness is thus identified with the supreme social values of the group. In a pastoral stage of culture the highest social concerns center in the flocks and herds. The ritual and ceremonial of the tribe reflect this with the full color of life. The Hebrew religion to this day carries in its central ceremonial, the feast of the Passover, its original pattern, in which the supreme object is the Lamb. When the monarchical stage is reached the highest values of the social order are bound up with the wisdom and justice and power of the monarch. These qualities are therefore held to be the essential attributes of the Supreme Being. All the ritual of worship exalts and invokes these attributes, and the most fundamental demands upon the people are to respect and reverence them. In self-criticism, at moments of crisis, the reflective individuals of the group identify themselves with the point of view of this ideal Self, and thus bring their own conduct more clearly into consciousness.

In the very nature of the process here set forth the Supreme Being embodies the highest social values, and is in the highest degree personal.¹ These social values vary among different peoples, but, for a given tribe or race, it is not in the least difficult to determine what they are. It is also true that the degree and quality of personality differ in the deities of these different religions, but they possess all the personal elements which the group has achieved and learned to prize. It is not to be supposed that a group which has not attained to some definite consciousness of itself, and in the individuals of which there is no clear notion of self or personality, should be able to conceive their gods in personal terms. But it is just as inconceivable that the deities should be impersonal at a stage in which the

¹ I am at a loss to understand how this point should have escaped a recent reviewer of my book, cited above. See MARY WHITON CALKINS. 'Defective Logic in the Discussion of Religious Experience.' *J. of Phil., Psychol., etc.*, 1911, 8, 606.

social organism is discriminated, and in which individual consciousness has arisen. All of these phases of consciousness move forward together. It is only in a highly organized society, where there is much specialization of industry and refinement of the arts of life, that individuals of rich and well organized personalities may be found. Likewise it is only in such a social order, and for such individuals, that it is possible to find a highly developed conception of a personal God. It is probably true also that the development of a social consciousness, with the necessary self-conscious individuals experiencing it, involves the conception of a supreme Object, regarded as personal. If our conscious experience is through and through a social affair so that the very objects of physical nature are determined by it, it is inevitable that the Object of the group consciousness should be personal and social.¹ It is also inevitable that the idea of God, if it functions vitally at all, should grow in richness and vitality and not "tend to become faded and washed out as the development of society proceeds."

One is inclined to think that a serious difficulty in the minds of some of the critics of a functional, social psychology of religion is that they regard the explanation of the object as identical with explaining it away! But even Berkeley had a wholesome respect for objects while vehemently insisting that they are merely ideas! Surely no one thinks any the less of the value or importance of human experience since psychology has explained the soul. The explanation, in psychological terms, of the God-consciousness, does not destroy that consciousness. Such consciousness is the counterpart and implication of our social experience, in so far as that experience is organized and vital. Our minds are fashioned in a social medium and our intellectual operations are conversations from first to last. In scientific thinking, the process becomes highly abbreviated and schematic but never wholly escapes the interlocutory form. In moral reflections, where a course of action is sought, the process is often quite simply that of a discussion between the various selves involved, and not without the sense of an Ideal Self serving as an Umpire or Judge. In the experiences characteristic of developed religion this practical, personal attitude is dominant. One enters into immediate and vital relations with the Divine Personality, communes with Him, prays to Him and depends upon Him.

¹ This point is apparently overlooked by Professor Coe in his discussion of 'Religion from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology.' *American Journal of Theology*, April, 1911, pp. 304 f.

There is a radical difference between this attitude and that of the psychologist at the moment of making a psychological inquiry. But fortunately the psychologist is a man who is required to live in a practical way a large part of the time. If he did not know and practice the difference between being a psychologist and a practical man, he would not get through a single day. Suppose he started shopping as a psychologist and gave himself to his scientific reflections at every turn. If he kept to his task, he would probably become so interested in studying the process of perception while standing at the street corner waiting for a car, that he would not be able to get aboard when it arrived! His behavior, however, would not disprove the reality of the street car, nor the fact that other people actually traveled on it.

Our social experience is the basic phase of all our experience. Within it are gradually discriminated selves and things, the social group and the ideal Social Self. All of these are modified and developed with the growth of experience. An understanding of their nature and functions affords control for their further determination and use.

GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES

RECENT TREATMENTS OF SOCIAL GROUPING

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The factors which enter into the formation of groups are so diverse that the objective material must be sought for in many social sciences. A consideration of the various sorts of groups leads to such criteria as race, occupation, intellectual interest and national feeling, thus taking us far from a purely psychological account of the processes involved in the rise and maintenance of groups.

On the strictly theoretical phases, little that is fundamental has appeared recently. Some of the articles noted are semi-popular in mode of attack; they are included to indicate a drift of opinion valuable as content for the social psychologist, and to accentuate the necessity of further elaboration by means of hypotheses able to cover the complexity of the data.

From the usual crop of articles having to do with general classification of occupational strata and the moral to be drawn, the first selected is an attempt to distinguish the levels of contemporary English class structure (F. G. D'Aeth, 'Present Tendencies of Class Differentiation.' *Sociol. Rev.*, 1910, 3, 267-276). The lower division is composed of the 'loafer,' the unskilled laborer, the artisan, and the small shopkeeper and clerk. The second division, constituting a minority of the population, consists of the smaller business man, the administrator and professional group, and 'the rich.' The old demarcation, laborers, shopkeepers, and gentry (including the professions), has broken down; the ancient family basis of cleavage is succeeded by that of 'economic ability' and standard of life; the working class group has increased immensely, while the gentry has diminished. There is now a greater migration from group to group, due to widespread education, democratic feeling, and city environment. The writer makes an inconclusive characterization of the classes regarding income and mentality. He sees in the artisans "a solid, independent, and valuable class in society, possessing a very fair general intelligence; shrewd at times; a simple mind, not following

a connected argument; laborious procedure at business meetings" (pp. 270-271).

A severe indictment of 'the middle class' is written by R. G. Davis ('The Middle Classes and Social Progress.' *Westminster Review*, 174, 379-382). Dilettante and motivated by money, having neither the courtesies of the aristocracy nor the homely virtues of the laborer, this group lives an unreal, unproductive existence. In the working people are higher concepts of art, and their class feeling comes from the "relative failure of modern civilization which has not seriously touched the masses of the people" (p. 381).

The criticism is indiscriminating, and there is no convincing criterion of differentiation. Nevertheless, there is an enormous volume of sentiment abroad in the world which Mr. Davis voices. In France the dissatisfaction is evident in the attitude of Le Bon, although he is the defender of the bureaucracy. In the organ of the Le Play school, *La Réforme Sociale*, appears an article on 'La Formation sociale de la Jeunesse des Classes aisées' (Paul de Rousiers, 1911, 62, 369-384). The premise is that the élite is the middle class, that it is losing its grip, that it should decide to work and be capable of working. How to elicit 'a moral élite' the author endeavors to explain. The youth must be trained to bear responsibility early, must gain technical knowledge as well as moral and religious dispositions, and in loyalty to his group and to the state must emulate the solidarity of the labor union.

There is an increasing amount of attention given to the causes and implications of the 'class-consciousness' developed among occupational groups. The student of social psychology finds the labor movement of Germany illustrative because of its traditions, strong organization, press, and leaders. Group control, feeling, and leadership are sympathetically and critically discussed in *Das moderne Proletariat* (Eine sozialpsychologische Studie, by Dr. R. Broda and Dr. J. Deutch. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1910. Pp. v+226). In the preface the authors say that the book is the result of long association with those who feel most keenly the stress of the wage system. The treatment divides into three parts: (1) history and present organization of the labor movement; (2) description of the attitude of 'the proletariat' to religion, ethics, 'rationalism,' the family, nationalism, and 'Massengeist'; (3) personal confessions of working people, the authors endeavoring to use a kind of questionnaire method in order to get at the 'mind' of this group.

The discussion of class-consciousness follows well-known lines.

The writers recite the tale of monotony and weariness born of the machine industry. Medieval personality in product has vanished; the factory worker loses control of his time, his wages, and the conditions of labor. Alone he is a shrunken self; united with his class he is buoyant and strong. Not for himself but for a future coöperative society is he perfecting a group organization. He becomes more imaginative, intelligent, and hopeful because of this consciousness of unity, since he believes that his class is fundamental, destined to contribute a constructive point of view to all society. The discipline of poverty and the machine is the driving force, and the delineation of the effect of machinery upon the attitudes of the workers is similar to that given in Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class*.

This book, along with periodical literature, registers several changes in the concept of class-consciousness. There is realization that no healthful unity is possible by mere unanimity on all subjects. Varying temperaments are welcomed (p. 128). Rivalry and flexible organization are assured by the policy of having the three divisions of the mass movement, trades unions, social democratic party, and coöperatives, develop individual methods without interference and at the same time, in matters affecting the common welfare, to act as a body. A nice question is presented by the conflicting claims of nationalism and internationalism. Writers have speculated on the relative power of patriotism and devotion to the international occupational tie. Each has its associations, its symbols, and emotional appeal. The answer in this volume is a reconciliation. "Die Nation als Kulturgemeinschaft ist dem Proletarier nicht minder teuer, als dem Angehörigen einer anderen Klasse" (p. 137). But no modern nation is safe unless the international class-consciousness of its people is strengthened in order to neutralize the destructive tendencies in present society (pp. 135-138). Formerly, stress was put upon stimulating a mass spirit without appreciating the need of accurate knowledge of changing conditions and the counter reaction of opposing groups. Now it is seen that the consciousness of one group is in terms of the shifting attitudes of another. A significant feature of the book is the narraton of the evolution of 'ein naiver Massenglaube' to one deepened and guided by education and better organization (p. 113). The development of class and sentiment has a bearing on the earlier doctrine of an ultimate classless society and suggests the more tenable principle—that when a particular basis of class differentiation is found to be harmful it is the business of the bigger collective unit to replace a functionless grouping and preserve

conflict on a higher plane. In all the directions of change noticed the wholesomeness of group and sub-group alternate friction and harmony is demonstrated, and Professor Cooley's contention sustained, that a group-consciousness is an organization, not a consensus and motionless uniformity.

That class consciousness in the modern labor movement marks a distinct moral gain in the thesis of Vida Scudder (*Atlantic Monthly*, 1911, 107, 320-330). The broadening of sympathy and perspective is immensely superior to jingoism and clan exclusiveness. The working class tighten the lines to reach a humanitarian goal. According to Hans Müller, the atheistic bent of socialism is giving way to an admission that a bare dualism of class and mass cannot supply the sympathetic attitude which must underlie constructive movements. The leaders direct most attention to reform of economic structure ('Das religiöse Moment in der sozialistischen Bewegung.' *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, 1910, 3, 1665-1669). It has long been held by the exponents of economic determinism that the technique of production and exchange controls the religious, legal, and every other phase of organization. Ethnological researches do not altogether sustain the view. A denial that there is an exact correspondence between economic structure and political system is advanced by L. Michels. He argues that the evolution of particular groups is guided by factors at variance with the demands of economic prosperity ('Wirtschafts- und sozialphilosophische Randbemerkungen.' *Arch. f. rechts. u. wirtsch. Philos.*, 1911, 4, 437-448).

Referring to the causes of group conflict within a state Max Huber points out that whenever the state loses touch with the demands of citizens, independent, hostile groups arise which may consolidate into an internationalism quite apart from national restrictions. The tendency to attribute legislation to personal and class aggrandizement is due to the critical bias of democratic nations. People place a higher value upon the community than upon law, and when the state seeks to repress a force which denies its autonomy, the groups concerned develop an 'international collective interest' ('Die soziologistischen Grundlagen des Völkerrechts.' *Arch. f. rechts. u. wirtsch. Philos.*, 4, 21-35). In the same vein John L. Gillin explains the conditions determining the rise of sects. He finds that fundamentally "sects are the result of forces stimulated to activity by a heterogeneity of the population of any social group. The lack of unity in the group results in the development of class-

consciousness" ('A Contribution to the Sociology of Sects.' *Amer. J. of Sociology*, 1910, 16, 236-252).¹

A résumé of the present status of the problem of caste is given by D. Warnotte (*Bulletin Mensual*, Instituts Solvay, May, 1911, 238, 1-11). The caste system of India exhibits the principles of group decadence. For many years the Brahmins, by means of protective and isolative taboos, have kept apart. The segregation of groups in India has prevented the advance of national patriotism. It is well known that the English have drawn a number of their native officials from the Brahmin class. Now the European education of the young Hindoo is leading to his denial of the sacredness of caste distinction, and he is using the ancestral devotion to a small group as a means of reaching a national consciousness. He recognizes that it is impracticable at present to include all classes in the exercise of political power, and he knows from European history that the élite spreads slowly among all classes. The objective point seems to be the glorifying of the 'ancient prestige' of India as contrasted with its 'present subjection,' and to utilize the high caste sentiment in order to oppose Hindoos to all 'strangers.'

The place of leaders in the control of groups is of much importance. Two representative tendencies of opinion are evident. As regards the function of leadership in the modern labor group, there is a rounded statement by Lüdwig Quessel ('Führer und Masse.' *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, 1910, 3, 1407-1412). The earlier view was that a leader should be a passive instrument yielding to the popular sentiment, that 'the people' were unqualifiedly superior political agents, that membership in an organization carries with it the capacity to pass judgment on all matters relating to the purposes of the whole, and that which concerns all should be decided by all. Trade unionists and social democrats in Germany tend to deny these assumptions. They hold that the feeling of solidarity must proceed from the corporate body, but in questions calling for knowledge of detail, tact, and judgment, nothing can take the place of the specialist. Primitive face-to-face oversight is no longer possible. The writer comments favorably on the English plan of restricting the use of the initiative

¹ There is an interesting reaction against making so much of the national and international consciousness. Several years ago Professor Royce advocated the worth of 'provincialism,' the formation of a 'local consciousness' for the sake of realizing the values of cosmopolitan interests. He intimated that our imaginative reach must have its base on small group relationships. *Race Questions and Other American Problems*, p. 107. Cf. Professor Hibben's recent defense of 'prejudice' and Cooley's discussion of the danger of superficiality, *Social Organization*, Chap. 10.

and the referendum, and of making the representative in parliament responsible for forwarding general policies, at the same time allowing scope to special ability.

Aside from recognition of the value of the leader's training, two advances are noteworthy. First, there is a denial that collective sentiment has automatic and predetermined channels for its overflow. Second, the leader's position becomes better defined. He is subjected to criticism from individuals in his group, a strong press, and hostile parties, and he is immune from freakish whims of popular feeling. Thus he is given leeway to act with initiative within a group whose traditions and purposes are fairly well defined.

Another view of the leader of the older political parties, following the school of Sighele and Tarde, is found in a work by A. Peterson (*Politik og Masse-moral*, Copenhagen: G. E. Gad, 1911. Pp. 182). It is not yet available except through excerpts translated by W. War-notte (*Bulletin Mensual*, May, 1911, 236, 1-10). The line of argument is not unique. It premises the vast rôle of the 'social milieu.' The special direction taken by society depends upon the temperament, the set of habit, and the 'material interest' of its members. There are leaders of temperament, of habit, and of material interest. In like manner parties are formed, dictated by one or more of these forces. It is the business of the leader to control his respective group by suggestion, appeal to primitive emotions, and general ideas meaning little but having volitional influence. However, the leader's purpose is conceived to be that which emanates from the 'mass' whose product he is. For the author the word *mass* replaces the French *foule*, and is defined as "a group of individuals who at a particular time are imbued with the same idea of aspiration and who have a consciousness of this community of thought, of wish, and of action."

A favorable proclivity is to explain the 'collective mind' under its various aspects of national, occupational, political, and religious bases of differentiation on the principle of line of attention, direction of interests, or special 'set' initiated by historical crises or accident. In discussing 'national psychology' Dr. R. Broda appears to depend upon an uncriticized conception of 'psychological type.' He discerns in the German labor movement a characteristic mysticism and emphasis upon education. In France and Germany the radicals are idealistic and full of 'Zukunftshoffnungen'; Australians show unemotional experimentalism. In America the spirit of initiative attending its political and economic evolution renders a segregated

class-consciousness difficult ('Zur psychologischen Differenzierung der internationalen Arbeiterbewegung.' *Dokum. d. Fortschritts*, 4, 262-269).

The concept of race is undergoing reconstruction; the criteria of the ethnological and anthropometrical schools are doubted. The assumption of fixed racial superiorities was assailed by Professor R. S. Woodworth in an address on 'Racial Differences in Mental Traits' (*Science*, 1910, 31, 171-186). He contends that not only the usual ethnological but also the as yet meagre psychological grounds of distinction between different races are inconclusive. The norms of 'type' and 'average' need to be checked up by that of distribution, since in two groups in which the average of abilities is equal the one with wider variations from genius to idiocy will rise to emergencies better (p. 173). Moreover, high rank in one direction may be accompanied by atrophy in another, and in a particular social circle, an approved sort of excellence is selected, ignoring equally good qualities. The psychology of peoples has not reached a satisfactory experimental basis, and about the only valid presumption is that instincts, emotion, and intellection are present in all groups. In tests by Rivers and others it is shown that in vision, color discrimination, hearing, reaction time, susceptibility to illusion, and power of attention, there are differences in individuals and some group superiorities, but when these results are corrected, there is slender justification for the theory of inherent racial qualities. Neither does the 'higher civilization,' e. g., of the German as contrasted with the native Australian warrant us to assert his superiority, because other factors—accidental inventions, amount of leisure and quickness of communication—determine the preëminence of a people. Some experimental work showing the relative facility in learning when school children are alone and in classes is described by W. H. Burnham ('The Group as a Stimulus to Mental Activity.' *Science*, 1910, 31, 761-767).

Another discussion of the same drift as that shown in Professor Woodworth's criticism is essayed by Mariano-H. Cornejo ('Le Race.' *Rev. Inter. de Sociologie*, 19, 161-189). Professor E. A. Ross takes the sociological position that the 'Chinese mind' is not a changeless racial entity: it is explainable by reason of the impetus given by centuries of memory training and exaltation of habit. The deliberate, unimpressionable, precedent-loving disposition of the yellow man, his aversion to the restless Western 'scientific' attitude is not due to absence of capacity, but rather to the fact

that hitherto the 'psychological climate' has been unfavorable to innovating thought ('Sociological Observations in Inner China.' *Amer. J. of Sociology*, 1911, 16, 721-733; 'The Race Mind of the Chinese.' *Independent*, Sept. 7, 1911, 526-528). Dr. R. Baron Budberg considers the patriarchal family and the consequent minimizing of individual responsibility to be the root of Chinese conservatism, since the Chinese state is the family written large ('Burg- u. Haftpflicht im chinesischen Volksleben.' *Globus*, 1910, 98, 285-287).

Israel Cohen describes 'The Jewish Community' (*Soc. Rev.*, 1910, 3, 216-226). He attributes the enduring homogeneity of the Jews to rigid religious prescriptions, an intense 'historical consciousness,' and the solidifying effect of persecution. Modern Jews are mostly urban, and in the midst of a dense population and a hostile environment lead a separated life. Until recently they have been debarred from civic responsibility, thus turning attention to commercial exploits and strengthening solicitude for their own group. However, liberal education and tolerance are tending to take the new generation away from the old Hebraism; the Jewish community, nevertheless, remains unique in its union of the historical and the religious consciousness.

A comprehensive statement of the 'Racial Element in Social Assimilation' is offered by Professor U. G. Weatherly (*Publications Amer. Sociological Society*, 5, 57-76). The advance is from family or tribal cohesion to 'cultural unity.' The fiction of blood kinship shades into devotion to a common sovereign, and into the 'psychic sympathy' of a nation. But ethnic patriotism is still a factor in recent history and may break down national cultural unity. Nationality is due to sentiment growing out of a community of past experience and present interests. "It is not sufficient that people should merely have undergone similar experiences. They must have undergone them together" (p. 62). A common language is the great destroyer of racial separateness within a group. Immigrants, including the Jews, who come to the 'nascent social bodies' of such countries as the United States and Australia are quickly assimilated by the language, customs, and ideals of the new lands. The writer agrees with other students that "racial and geographical solidarity is already to a limited extent giving way to interracial and international class solidarity."

A suggestive paper which touches upon much of the theory of social grouping is contributed by Professor G. R. Vincent ('The Rivalry of Social Groups.' *Publications Amer. Sociological Society*,

5, 241-256). The group is regarded as a definite and workable concept, for it is a tangible subdivision of the vaguer 'society' and the 'nidus of personality.' The idea of a group presumes (1) a common interest, (2) a realization of the group as such by each member, (3) that the constituents of the group are aware of the common interest and know that the image of their group is shared by the others. In the meaning of group the author includes the boy's gang, the labor union, the church, the coterie, the village, and the nation.

Competition, conflict, and rivalry are the chief agencies which force human beings into groups. Each group, by suggestion, imagery, and other means of control forms 'permanent types of reaction'—the mores. Collective pride, type heroes, the elaboration of a 'protective philosophy,' ridicule, and intolerance are ways of meeting the conflict situation. Fashion is interpreted as a form of group rivalry. The 'mob mind' may have a functional value in solving a problem quickly; on the ideational level 'free speech' induces a prompt cohesion of forces against a competing group. "A national group is to be thought of as an inclusive unity with a fundamental character upon the basis of which a multitude of groups compete with and rival each other. It is the task of the nation to control and utilize this group struggle, to keep it on as high a plane as possible, to turn it to the common account. . . . It is in conflict or competition with other nations that a country becomes a vivid unity to the members of constituent groups. It is rivalry which brings out the sense of team work, the social consciousness" (pp. 255-256).

So much territory is traversed in Professor Vincent's sketch that the promised longer treatment is to be desired. It is evident that on the whole the literature reviewed is either entirely descriptive and classificatory or that the psychological machinery is not adequate to interpret the social facts. This is, of course, characteristic of the present state of social psychology, with a few happy exceptions. The treatments are inclined to be too psychological in the solipsistic sense or too sociological in the structural sense. It is assumed, following tradition, that the self is entirely inner, and that the problem is to get consciousness into that of another self. Another tendency is to suppose that a sufficient method is to stratify the phenomena of society into psychic planes and currents, and to give the individual a part to play by a mechanism of suggestion and imitation. A statement of the 'converse of attitudes' involved in group relationships and the motor process by which the development of feeling, symbol and thought as a social dialectic is really explained and not obscured by a deluge of words, is imperative.

The failure to give a satisfactory picture of a complex situation by the use of a halting psychology is striking when an attempt to apply a professedly social psychology to a social problem is made. No one has accused Gustav Le Bon of being unbiased, so that the employment of his latest venture for illustrative purposes will present the case somewhat exaggerated (*La Psychologie politique et la Défense sociale*). Like M. Lévy-Bruhl, who distinguishes primitive man's logic of the sentiments from the modern logic of the intellect (*Les Fonctions mentales dans les Sociétés inférieures*), he makes a cleft between the mob-like *Mentalité ouvrière* ruled by passion and the ideational scientific mind of the élite. According to his doctrine, individual psychology makes no contribution to the understanding of social facts, since *l'âme collective* differs in toto from *l'âme individuelle* (p. 126), Further, sentiment and intelligence are disparate, ruled by different laws (p. 141). The logic of ideas cannot interpret the feelings. Social consciousness is fostered in the crowd; the élite increase in self-consciousness and lose in consciousness of solidarity. In the concluding pages, the author, apparently realizing that since ideas are lodged in one section of the individual and society and sentiments in another, there is no encouraging prospect for effective communication, resorts to another faculty, that of will. Just because the motor character both of idea and feeling is disregarded, the final *deus ex machina* must be a separate entity, *une volonté forte* (p. 375).

That there is a serious political situation in France is undoubted. It is doubtful whether on the basis of M. Le Bon's Cartesian philosophy it can be met. If we assume that the nearer we get to perception and feeling the lower down in worth we are; if we assume that the gregarious instinct, the unanimity of image and action in the mob, the losing of all the conditions of individuality, is a true characterization of what social consciousness means; if thinking is exclusively an isolating process and not an intercourse, it is no wonder that with Le Bon we are led to denounce, to despair, to demand scientific prevision of fatalities, and to appeal to pure force. The difficulty is that there is no motor technique to warrant us in advancing from sentiment to idea, and from the individual to the collective standpoint. Le Bon cannot admit that self-consciousness arises in a situation involving an analysis and interpretation of the attitudes of other selves, that this situation is first experienced as an emotional one, and that by alternate rivalry and adjustment the individual expands in feeling and cognition. It is legitimate, there-

fore, in opposition to Le Bon, to interpret the conflict between the crowd and the élite as evidence of expanding sentiment and idea in both groups, each party growing in knowledge of the situation and defining the issues. Politics for Le Bon is a process of imposing superior power and control devices upon a non-contributive group. Its reaction is of no consequence, since what it possesses is identified with the primitive pre-ideational consciousness. Perhaps it is itself proof of provincialism and social grouping if one turns to Professor Cooley's balanced treatment of social classes and their mutual contributions in Parts 3 and 4 of his *Social Organization*.

SPECIAL REVIEWS

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The Influence of Newspaper Presentations Upon the Growth of Crime and Other Anti-Social Activity. FRANCES FENTON. The University of Chicago Press, 1911. Pp. 96.

To get at the effect of the appeals made by the newspaper is the purpose of this thesis. The point of view is objective and functional. As a study in applied sociology, it aims to suggest ways by which "the control of stimuli to activity for the purpose of diminishing crime" may be obtained. Premising that 'orthodox psychology' has centered interest around conscious processes, to the neglect of unconscious presentations, Dr. Fenton criticizes previous treatments of the problem, formulates a definition of suggestion, and inquires into the conditions in the individual and in 'objective social conditions as stimuli' which facilitate the going over of presentation into act.

Two lines of analysis are used: (1) direct evidence of newspaper suggestion revealed in the confessions of the criminal, cases cited by the newspapers themselves showing stimuli to crime, statements of persons who deal with social offenders, and other evidence; (2) determination of the amount of space devoted by newspapers to accounts of anti-social activity. The cases cited strengthen the growing conviction that some newspapers have specialized on the spectacular and dramatic, have tended to break down the inhibitions of the weak, and to lower public standards. It is also demonstrated that the relative amount of space devoted to anti-social matter—from 5.91 to 20.02 per cent.—is not offset by constructive editorial discussion (pp. 48, 91).

The conclusion treats of the pecuniary motive in relation to the social function of the newspaper, and gives helpful recommendations for improvement. The treatment throughout is clear and vigorous, and shows the possibility of a scientific method of obtaining data which the social psychologist may confidently use when he essays to follow Professor Cooley's procedure, that of 'sympathetic introspection.' From the specifically psychological standpoint, the writer had made no contribution, and one feels that the analyses and quo-

tations from many authors could have been replaced with a positive statement of the concepts of suggestion, habit, 'control,' and attention without detriment to the argument. The orthodox psychologist probably realizes that the whole cycle of the act is more inclusive than our distinct awareness of it, and he knows that he has been most successful in introspecting and measuring the cognitive processes. And he may legitimately claim that without his analysis of the way our conscious life goes on, such 'objective' treatment as that of Dr. Fenton's would have no guiding point of view. He is indebted to the neurologist because of the light shed by the neurone on the conditions under which our conscious and unconscious activities continue. The psychologist is similarly grateful for this admirable interpretation of the social conditions giving rise to below-grade reactions to stimuli.

ERNEST L. TALBERT

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Sociology and Modern Social Problems. CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.
New York: American Book Co., 1910. Pp. 331.

In this book five chapters are devoted to the problem of the family; other chapters discuss such matters as immigration, the city, poverty, crime, and education. The treatment is objective, concrete, and elementary, making the work valuable for the college student and for those whose specialties forbid an intensive cultivation of the field of social issues. Emphasis is placed upon the biological, statistical, and economic phases. In a sane fashion the necessity of understanding the ethnic and biological background of the negro and the immigrant is enforced. The author expressly confines himself to non-psychological sides of the questions outlined, although he does not avoid them altogether.

Like other enthusiasts for the new sociology, Professor Ellwood believes that it supplies a synthesis and general point of view for the special sciences. Its problem is that of the organization and progress of society. It handles in a general way what the older disciplines work out in an abstracted manner. It cannot ally itself with any narrow program of reform too closely, else it sacrifices its character as a science; nevertheless he urges that its ultimate aim is practical, although as yet it has not developed a satisfactory technique for the attack of complex problems.

There are several consequences of this combined non-psychological and synthetic mode of treatment which may be mentioned. The supposition is that sociology first develops its norms and then hands

them over to the moralist to be criticized and applied. There is danger of a difficulty here, even if we admit that ethics is, in any peculiar sense, a normative science. I cannot see that the norms of the sociologist have a distinguished place and validity for ethics, since it, as Professor Ellwood says, is becoming more and more social in its outlook. What the moralist takes over is material and interpretation from any source, not more or less fixed norms from a general science called sociology. The elaboration of the conditions and implications of the ethical situation is the province of ethics, and the facts and the interpreting norms of all phases of experience are, from the ethical standpoint, subjected to revaluation. There is a species of books on ethics, of course, which attempts a structural and synthetic account, forgetting the specific experience originating the whole problem. Such was the case with the followers of Bentham, but they finally issued in a standpoint reconciling motive and consequence. In other words, to eliminate the psychological in a treatment of social problems is to cripple the ethical, and to confuse the political background of conduct with the issues of a specific ethical difficulty.

A second illustration of the inadequacy of a non-psychological statement is found in the writer's exposition of the family. There is a fine appreciation of the fundamental character of this institution, and the sociological causes of its present instability are well canvassed. I realize that it is pedagogically important to uphold the sanctity of marriage and to point to statistics for confirmation. It is also important to discuss the matter from the angle of the development of attitudes in this small group. The family is the field for developing 'disposition,' ideas, and sentiment, and by taking successively the standpoint of father, mother, and child toward one another and toward encompassing groups in a discussion of its function, there is more possibility of harmonizing the subjective and objective factors than by relying overmuch on figures and biological data, however valuable they may be. Professor Ellwood does not ignore the educational and moral aspects of the family. Perhaps the point I wish to make may be illustrated by referring to the mode of treatment commenced in Chapters 10-13 of Helen Bosanquet's book on the *Family*, and by the concrete fact that some divorces in this country may be justified if one considers the effect of discordant family life upon the child's future social attitudes when from the objective sociological view there may be condemnation.

A final comment relates to the possible effect upon the student

and upon mature people of overdoing the sociological doctrine of 'interrelation of factors' and complexity of social problems. It may be that the intended purpose of inducing a broad comprehension and a hopeful working out of difficulties is frustrated. We fail to see where to take hold, and are not sure that taking hold will do any good. One comes away from reading the 'objective' scientific school of French sociologists with the impression that everything must be left to the savants who operate the social pressure. Our recourse is to our own psychological technique in lieu of the future technique of the sociologist.

All this says nothing against the excellence of Professor Ellwood's book within its aim and self-imposed limits.

ERNEST L. TALBERT

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Individual and Society. J. MARK BALDWIN. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1911. Pp. 210.

A brief résumé of Professor Baldwin's doctrines, especially that of the relation between the generalizing and the particularizing aspects of the life of society, together with some applications, is the content of this volume. Since there is no essential change in point of view, an extended notice is unnecessary. However, there is a tendency to insist upon the fact that the individual is no mere 'repeating machine,' and the central problem is: If the individual 'absorbs obediently and imitatively the matter of the social life and habit of his group' (p. 146), in what sense can he be said to 'invent'?

The answer is: (1) There is phylogenetic continuity; (2) there is an emerging of instincts and feelings paralleling the racial biological sequence; (3) these instincts in the individual are both of the friendly and of the hostile sort, thus guaranteeing the alternate separatist and coöperative tendencies by which growth in individual and society takes place; (4) in the child and in the adult there is an inherent tendency for response to reinstate the original stimulus; this is true all the way from perceptual up to deliberative processes; (5) the individual's departure from his copy is a matter of spontaneous improvement upon previous data by means of anticipative imagination; (6) a constant dialectic goes on; 'invention' is as natural as imitation (p. 149); 'idealization' produces variations which are selected or rejected by the group. Society proper appears when the biological and instinctive forms of connection are succeeded by the

conscious ideational. Progress consists in the reciprocal working of the conventionalizing tradition and the individualizing invention.

As a general schema, not much exception can be taken to the description, and the many ways of stating the problem make objections difficult, since another page will be cited. Notwithstanding the apparent just and balanced treatment, some readers of Professor Baldwin's earlier books will still be troubled by the crucial question—how the individual and his inventions can be explained on the basis of the mechanism offered. That the original deed and thought are not a bolt from the blue, that the reformer works within a group-consciousness, may be conceded, but just how, when, and why are not evident. A restatement of previous criticisms of the blanket use of the term imitation is uncalled for. If the mechanism which explains the child's response to the gestures of the nurse, however extended, is adequate to explain the symbolism of conception, then thinking seems to be nothing more than an assimilation of one's already determined self to an 'interacting' self. There ensues an interesting shifting of the social scenery. One feels that there is something more involved, and yet fears to invoke Bergson's creative push of life.

ERNEST L. TALBERT

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Social Value. A Study in Economic Theory. (Critical and Constructive.) B. M. ANDERSON, JR. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911. Pp. xviii+199.

Dr. Anderson has approached the disputed field of economic value from the point of view of the social psychologist, seeking to identify value as a conscious phase in experience before it becomes the subject of treatment by the economist. His first undertaking is to refute the doctrine of both the English and the Austrian schools, which make value a matter of relations either in exchange or in marginal utilities, *i. e.*, in the relation of subjective desires. Against the English school, Dr. Anderson maintains that the ratios of exchange imply a quantity of which the units of exchange are a measure. In the definitions of value by the Austrians the author finds the very idea of value which is to be defined. Even Professor Clark's definition of value as 'social and subjective' proves unsatisfactory because its author merely sums up the individual costs and individual satisfactions connected with economic goods. The economic goods being abstracted from the social organism which gives them their power,

can be estimated only in psychical costs and satisfactions and these being abstracted from the rest of the individual's interests and desires can be estimated only in the economic goods, and again this seeming absolute value revolves in a circle of values each chasing the other.

From this relativity the author appeals to the social organism within which are found the 'funded meanings' which lie back of all values and to the emotional-volitional attitude of the individual which 'motivates' economic action. For Dr. Anderson the theory of value in economics, so far as it is real, is a theory of price, *i. e.*, a measurement of values that themselves cannot be stated in mere numerical ratios. Not even when the Austrian school carries the ratios into the subjective field and finds in the marginal utility of the object an attempted expression of the demand of the individual, does value appear as the relation of desires. "Why has the good, A, value? Because men desire it? No, that is not enough: the men who desire it must have other economic goods, *i. e.*, wealth, with which to buy it. And why will these goods buy it? Because they have *value!*" (46-47). For this school the ratio of desires is not an estimate of the emotional-volitional attitude of the buyer, but of the goods with which he purchases what he desires, which again have value through other desires, etc., etc.

Dr. Anderson makes evident the agreement of much current economic writing with his own position that many social forces beside those economic processes which can be stated in numerical terms, go to change values; that value cannot be spoken of as unchanged while values change. Value as well as values is constantly increased and diminished by legal, ethical and customary changes. But while economic writers are admitting the real influence which social conditions and organization have upon economic goods, their theories and methods hark back to the individualistic period with its contract theory of society and its Humean psychology.

Dr. Anderson would change all this by frankly admitting that these social influences not only modify values, but that values can be conceived to exist only as social phenomena. They arise not through the addition of the pleasures and pains of men, but through organized social activity which is supra-individual. No one individual can express in his wants the value of wheat as it appears in the market and the addition of all men's wants lacks just that social organization by which these wants become articulate to each other and to the men themselves, by which as values they appear in consciousness. The author founds his sociological position on the doctrine

of Professor Cooley's books *Human Nature and the Social Order* and *Social Organization*. Consciousness is social as fundamentally and immediately as it is individual. From this position it follows that conduct is 'motivated' by social forces which cannot be expressed in individualistic states of consciousness, and in this social organization of human conduct, in its enormous implications of meanings which never fully appear in the minds of individuals, can be found the values which get partial measurement in economic terms.

From the sociological statement the author turns to psychology, and after following the structural account of value give by Professor Urban in his *Valuation* leaves this to accept Professor Dewey's functional statement, as more fundamental and more germane to the economic problem.

If social organization gives the funded meanings which back up and enforce values, they lie in individual consciousness as forces, motivations which the author terms emotional-volitional attitudes. Values lead to economic action, they are not relations. Brought into conflict with each other the common quality of value in the objects that calls out the emotional-volitional attitudes is measured. But the measurement is not the quality. Here again not the mere feelings of pleasure and pain, nor the bare desires represent the whole attitude. This involves not only these phases but also a feeling of reality. But what goes beyond all of these elements of structure is the function of the attitude—that of enforcing action, and not merely the act of measurement but the entire conduct of the individual.

Thus in the social and psychological backgrounds of economic measurement and action is placed the value and the values which the economic process partially estimates in the entire conduct of the individual.

The first great service which social philosophy and psychology seems likely to perform for economics, if we follow Dr. Anderson, is to lift from the shoulders of the economists the task of finding and defining value, leaving them only the task of evaluating in terms of price objects and processes in production and distribution. But because the economists will accept value from the hand of the social psychologist and the sociologist, he will be the more ready to recognize the sources out of which the values arise which he is called upon to measure. He will find in his own theory an analysis of existing conditions which abstracts from the full content of experience, and must therefore constantly test its judgments by the changing experience which in its full life it cannot follow.

Dr. Anderson's thesis is most forcibly and clearly written. His acquaintance with the literature of sociology and psychology bearing upon his theme is as full and adequate as it is with that of the economic doctrine of value. It is perhaps too much to ask that he should fill in the gap which still lies between the social sciences and social psychology, but it is worth our while to view this gap afresh in this attempt to use social psychology to interpret economic theory. One of the most striking impressions which the present writer has received from Dr. Anderson's treatise is that his chapters upon the sociology of value and the psychology of value have no functional relationship with each other. Either might have been omitted without seriously affecting the other. Each stands upon its own feet. Following Professor Cooley Dr. Anderson shows that value is a phenomenon of social organization. Following Professor Urban and Dewey he shows that it is an emotional-volitional attitude. What is the functional relation of these two positions? It is impossible to get a definite answer to this in Dr. Anderson's book. While he has affirmed that consciousness is both social and individual, he does not actually place the social organization as the objective world which answers in consciousness to the subjective emotional-volitional attitude. Nor does he ask what are the conditions under which value takes the form of 'funded meaning' in the social organization, nor under what conditions it appears as emotional-volitional attitudes. We are left with the impression that value is a social, supra-individual, reality which can exist in no one consciousness—and yet it does in some sense exist there as emotional-volitional attitude. The final sentence reads: "Ends, aims, purposes, desires, of many men, mutually interacting and mutually determining each other, modifying, stimulating, creating each other, take tangible, determinate shape, as economic values, and the technique of the social economic organization responds and carries them out." This implies that the values arise out of the individual desire through their mutual interactions. But is not the actual situation in consciousness that the social organization that stands over against the self has a different logical character from the 'ends, aims, purposes and desires' of the individual? And is not the process of consciousness, and especially the process of evaluation, a functional interaction between the world as social object and the self as subject. What was funded meaning becomes emotional-volitional attitude, and what is emotional-volitional attitude becomes meaning.

It is in the process of stating the attitude in terms of funded

meaning that we must evaluate it—measure it against other attitudes and determine what is its economic sum as compared with that of other emotional-volitional attitudes that arise demanding their expression. This interaction which Professor Stuart has indicated as the logic of the process of evaluation is left out of Dr. Anderson's treatment of value. That our social psychology is not yet fully adequate to this task is one of the important conclusions that may be drawn from this brilliant volume.

G. H. M.

RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

An Empirical Study of Prayer. JAMES BISSETT PRATT. *Amer. J. of Relig. Psychol. and Educ.*, 1910, 4, 47-67.

The questionnaire method is used. "In what do people's prayers actually consist? What is their nature and content? How are they used? and How well do they serve their purpose?" Prayer is actually practised for the purpose of petition or communion. Half of those whose prayers are largely petitions do not believe that God is changed by them; they continue the practise of such prayers because of the impulse to pray and because of the subjective benefits experienced from the actual formulation of these petitions. Other answers note the exertion of an influence (1) upon the mind of him who prays, (2) upon the mind of others, (3) upon material things—relief from personal danger, victory in athletics, and the cure of sickness. All these may be explained psychologically in terms of suggestion or autosuggestion. The experience known as the sense of communion with God is an interesting part of the psychology of religion. The invigorating influence of prayer is an unquestionable fact of empirical psychology. Prayer is one of the living forces like faith in harvest and the love of children.

C. M. BREYFOGLE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Is Faith a Form of Feeling? A. C. ARMSTRONG. *The Harvard Theol. Rev.*, 1911, 4, 71-79.

Faith in the form of feeling was commended in eras of doubt as "a substitute for the halting processes of reason with their dubious or negative conclusions." This motive has markedly influenced the religious development of modern times. Man's emotional life is essentially connected with his cognition; its bodily side apart, it is

feeling related to idea. Hence the resolution of faith into mere feeling overlooks an essential element in the total phenomenon, namely, the intellectual aspect of religion.

C. M. BREYFOGLE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Aufgabe und Methode der Religionspsychologie. HERMANN BANKE. *Zsch. f. Religionspsychologie*, 1911, 5, 97-104.

The author's chief criticisms of the American presentation of religious psychology, made on the basis of the works of Professor James and Professor Starbuck, concern the following questions: (1) The natural scientific method used, (2) the relation of history and psychology to the formation of religious values and judgments, (3) that which Wobbermin calls the consideration of the question of truth, which is really the relation of psychology to the normative theory of knowledge in the psychology of religion. According to the author's view, psychology sets forth a theory of knowledge; this is only possible with the help of functions, psychologically determined. But this should form the introduction to a formal study of the science of religion; for an empirical psychological study, only a formal concept of religion is necessary. As soon as one sets forth a definite conclusion as to religious values, he leaves the field of psychology of religion for that of the philosophy of religion.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Religion als Seelenkunst. WILHELM GEORGE. *Zsch. f. Religionspsychologie*, 1910, 4, 196-208.

Law and customs, religion and art, are different radiations from national and racial character. In law and customs the objective social law comes to realization; in art and religion the individual's subjective demands and needs are uppermost. Religion may be called an art of the 'soul,' a creative fashioning produced in the world of ideas under deep feeling and undertaken on the basis of faith in the value of action.

C. M. BREYFOGLE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Ethnological Background of the Eucharist. J. A. MAGNI. *Amer. J. of Relig. Psychol. and Educ.*, 1910, 4, 1-47.

To discover the root idea of sacrament is the object of this article. The idea is found in the fact that whatever object was believed to

be the embodiment of the deity in primitive times was sacramentally eaten for the purpose of absorbing the divine attributes and for nursing and strengthening the physical bond between the tribe and its totem god. The genetic development is shown in the ethnological background of the Orient and particularly of Asia Minor from 600 B.C. to the early Christian era, and in the striking parallels of the Mithraic and Gnostic cults in which the primitive savage belief had been revived and disseminated in the form of mystic and sacramental communion. The age of Christianity in Asia Minor is a synthesis of Semitic, Greek, and possibly Indian thought. The Christian sacrament is Pauline in origin and Paul a child of a credulous, uncritical age, his mind absorbing unconsciously the prevalent idea. The Eucharist is of ancient pagan origin, having become a part of the Christian cult by a process of theological speculation on the meaning of Christ's death, resurrection, and mission.

C. M. BREYFOGLE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NOTES AND NEWS

THE present number of the BULLETIN, dealing especially with social and religious psychology, has been prepared under the editorial care of Professor G. H. Mead.

THE following items are taken from the press:

PROFESSOR JOSEPH JASTROW, of the University of Wisconsin, gave a public lecture entitled "On the Trail of the Subconscious," at the university on December 4, under the auspices of the university association for research and Phi Beta Kappa.

WITH the issue for January-March, 1912, *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education* will become the *Journal of Religious Psychology, including its Anthropological and Sociological Aspects*, having as editors President G. Stanley Hall and Professor Alexander F. Chamberlain. The journal will continue to be published at Clark University under the auspices of the library.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE.—Owing to the great demand for space, the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW and PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN will be increased to about 480 pages each next year. From January 1, 1912, the subscription to the Review and Bulletin will be \$5. During the present month subscriptions may be renewed at the old rate (\$4.50).

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Names of contributors are printed in SMALL CAPITALS, and the page numbers of the contributions in **Full Face Type**. In the case of authors reviewed or summarized the page numbers are in *Italics* and in the case of mention in the notes they are in Roman Type.

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